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Speed Discounting and Racial Disparities: 
Evidence from Speeding Tickets in Boston
*
 
Law enforcement officers are allowed to exercise a significant amount of street-level 
discretion in a variety of ways. In this paper, we focus on a particular prominent kind of 
discretionary behavior by traffic officers when issuing speeding tickets, speed discounting. 
Officers partially forgive motorists by writing a lower speed level than the speed that officers 
observe. Verifying the level of speed discounting by different groups of officers and motorists 
and ascertaining the presence of racial disparities in this lenient policing are the main 
objectives of this paper. We find that minority officers, particularly African-Americans, are 
harsher on all motorists but even harsher on minority motorists regarding speed discounting. 
The minority-on-minority disparity appears to be stronger in situations involving Hispanic 
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Although  [the officer] wrote the man a ticket for only 10 m.p.h. over the 35 m.p.h. 
limit, he made a note in the top right-hand corner of the ticket: “64.” Through a 
Boston  police spokeswoman, [he] said that notation meant the driver was actually 
going 64 m.p.h., o r 29 m.p.h. over the limit. The spokeswoman said [the officer] 
would sometimes lower the speed on a ticket, to save a driver a high fine. But the 
notation was there in case the driver challenged the ticket in court. (Bill Dedman and 
Francie Latour, The Boston Globe, July 20, 2003) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Police officers are allowed to exercise a significant deal of street-level discretion. A crucial 
issue is to  ascertain whether they use their  bestowed power  appropriately for the sake of 
effective policing (e.g. overlooking mildly-speeding vehicles to facilitate the traffic flow) . A 
strict officer is one who does not use any discretion. Observing  a speeding vehicle,  a strict 
officer will  stop it,  give a ticket to the motorist, and impose a fine according to the statutory 
formula. In reality, however, an officer using discretion could 1) not even stop the vehicle, 2) 
stop it but just let it go with an oral warning, 3) stop and give a written warning, or 4) issue a 
ticket but discount the speed and/or the fine.
1 Various factors such as the driver’s attitude, age, 
gender, race, and financial situation – as  much as the latter can be judged by officers – 
apparently play significant roles in officers’ discretion.
2 
In this paper, we focus on a particular prominent type of discretionary behavior – speed 
discounting; officers give a “break ” to motorists by reporting a lower speed level than their 
                                                  
1 There are also subtle things that  officers can control, such as length of stopping time, language, and 
friendliness, which can affect the disutility of the motorist.  
2 “There are always mitigating circumstances in a stop,” an officer said in an interview with the Boston Globe. 
“Anything could be said or could happen. Attitudes, people talking back to you. The circumstances change with 
each individual driver.”  The same officer also admitted that he rarely gave fines to elderly drivers, “presuming 
they were on a fixed income” (Dedman and Latour, 2003).   2 
actual speed (as shown in the above quote). A crucial  question here is whether there exist 
racial disparities in speed discounting b enefits that motorists receive, that is, whether, say, 
minority motorists are more harshly treated by white officers, whether minority officers are 
less lenient to minority motorists, and so on.  
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Figure 1 can serve as an important starting point to illustrate that speed discounting is very 
prevalent indeed. The graph is  the histogram of reported speed on  25,738 speeding  tickets 
issued by Boston police officers from April 2002 to November 2003. Observe that more than 
30% of tickets are cited for driving exactly at 10 m.p.h. over the limit (hereafter,  unless 
otherwise noted, the speed is always denoted as the miles per hour above the limit).  There 
exist  other  less outstanding spikes at some specific speed  levels, such  as 15  and 20.  The 
above graph shows, first of all, that the speed  reported  on tickets – especially  at the spikes –   3 
should not be the actual speed.
3  Rather, the histogram shows  that  officers’  discretionary 
speed reporting  distorts the distribution especially in the range 10-14. As we will  elaborate 
later, conditional on getting ticketed at speed levels such as 10 or slightly higher, the fact that 
a motorist gets cited for driving at 10 will most likely indicate that the officer gives a break to 
the motorist. If  this empirical strategy o f exploiting the spike at 10  to elicit officers’ 
discretionary behavior is valid, we can  test for racial disparities in speed discounting by 
comparing the probability of getting cited exactly at 10  across different pairs of officers’ and 
motorists’ races.  
Using the data on the 20-month record of  speeding tickets (and  the two-month record of 
warnings) issued by Boston  traffic officers, we find that  with respect to speed discounting, 
minority officers are harsher on all motorists, but they are even harsher on minority motorists. 
The finding is robust when  controlling for motorists’ zip code as well as neighborhoods 
where citations were issued  and when correcting for the potential selection bias associated 
with officers’ strategic ticketing behavior. Our main finding appears to be stronger among 
Hispanic officers, infrequently ticketing officers, male motorists, those driving old vehicles, 
and those driving in minority residential neighborhoods. 
Although minority  officers too give speed discounting, those who give speed discounting 
are predominantly white officers. We also find that male officers and inexperienced young 
officers are more likely to exhibit discretionary behavior. We find no gender disparity and 
little evidence on disparate treatment by motorists’ age.  
It is clear that our findings reflect something much more complicated than officers’ pure 
preference-based  racial  bias.  In order to account for our findings comprehensively, it is 
important to  know the status of minority officers within the police force and perceptions 
regarding them in the communities they serve, while knowing  interactions between officers 
                                                  
3 Clarke (1996), using about 16.5 million observations in Illinois, found that the speed distribution – recorded 
mechanically, not by officers – is normally distributed and centered at the speed limit under free flow conditions.     4 
and motorists during stops  as well as motorists’ driving records (which are not  currently 
being collected in any racial profiling data) in more detail would of course be invaluable.  We 
will later elaborate on the former aspect more. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related literature. Section III 
introduces the data and explains the empirical identification strategy of exploiting the 
clustering of tickets at the speed of 10. Section IV presents regression results and robustness 
checks. In Section V we ask a question of social significance, that is, why minority officers 
are harsher on minority motorists. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
It is worth pointing out, at the outset,  how the present paper and research topic are related 
to the recently growing literature on racial profiling in vehicle searches.4  The main point here 
is that ticketing and vehicle searching behavior are two very different animals in nature. First, 
in the case of speeding violation, officers can – albeit with some error – first directly observe 
the degree of the offense, i.e. the speed over the limit (the researcher observes only the speed 
reported by the officer). Thus, the remaining decision is as to how strictly they would handle 
the case. Consequently, eliciting officers’ discretionary behavior is  possible in this case. On 
the other hand, in the case of v ehicle searching, an  officer is supposed to conduct a search 
                                                  
4 The identification approaches are various, and the results are mixed. Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) show 
that racially biased monitoring implies that the equilibrium rate at which contraband is seized (the “hit rate”) is 
lower for the groups subject to bias.  In some data sets, the race of officers is also observable, which makes 
different approaches feasible. Antonovics and Knight (2004) use the same Boston data that we use in this paper 
and test whether officers are more likely to conduct a search if the race of the officer differs from that of the 
driver. Anwar and Fang (2006) propose a new test (the rank-order test) for relative racial prejudice based on a 
behavioral model. Using the Florida highway data, they cannot reject the null hypothesis of no racial bias, which 
does not mean, as they emphasize in the paper, that racial bias does not exist. Close and Mason (2007) develop a 
pairwise-comparison outcome test and, using the same Florida data,  reject the null hypothesis of no 
discrimination.   5 
without first observing the presence of any illegal behavior. Thus,  such an  officer  will 
necessarily try to infer a probability of an offense by processing all information available to 
him/her  - including the race of the motorist. This mind process is unobservable even to the 
motorist, so it is difficult for  any third party (including  the econometrician) to  figure out 
whether the officer used the driver’s race as a productive resource (Persico, fo rthcoming). 
It is generally true that officers would treat certain motorists more strictly if these motorists 
seem likely to  break the law in the future when treated leniently. In the case of speeding 
tickets, however, it seems unlikely that race is informative of such recidivism particularly for 
moderate speeders like those we focus on in this paper. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that 
the degree of strictness when issuing speeding tickets will alter motorists’ speeding behavior 
since driving style is found to be habitual to an exte nt (Lawpoolsri et al., 2007). 
Second, in the case of vehicle searching, officers deal with those who are potentially major 
offenders and felons. Thus,  it  may make sense that officers target a particular segment of 
population (e.g. a particular race) given the “hit rate” criterion. On the other hand, speeding 
motorists are  likely to be “non-criminal” people (in fact, a strong case could be  made that 
criminals would not speed rationally). Similarly, while  most officers might consider vehicle 
searching a high-risk task, issuing speeding tickets is likely to be considered “mundane” or 
“routine.” Lastly, officers who are lenient in vehicle searches could easily be accused of 
violating laws, while leniency in  issuing  speeding tickets would  even  be considered 
“humane.” In sum, i t would not be surprising to find  that officers behave differently in these 
two cases.   
While to date there is no work on speed discounting in particular - or officer leniency in 
general - and racial disparities in that context, a related strand of research  too  concerns 
officers’ decision-making regarding whether they issue tickets (or warnings) to a driver with 
certain characteristics. Most papers in this strand  attempt to elicit racial  preferences of 
officers from their ticketing behavior, that is, whether to issue a ticket or a warning to a   6 
particular driver. The state-sponsored Northeastern Study (Farrell et al., 2004) uses the same 
dat a that we use in this paper. Their general results reveal that there are m ajor disparities in 
ticketing behavior of officers of different races and genders to motorists of different races and 
genders.5 The study has been criticized in that it employs the standard benchmark test, which 
basically compares the shares of racial minorities in the population to their shares in the 
sample of drivers ticketed. It is, however, found that the racial composition of Census-based 
residential population poorly represents the racial composition of drivers on the road.
6 Also 
there is no mention of the speed-discounting phenomenon in this extensive study - nor in any 
other study on officers’ ticketing behavior that will be summarized below. 
There have been attempts to overcome the so-called  “denominator problem” in the 
benchmark approach. McConnell and Scheidegger (2001) compared tickets issued by air-
patrol officers and by ground-patrol officers. The assumption is that the race of the driver 
cannot be determined by the air-patrol officer. They matched ground-patrol and air-patrol 
speeding tickets across day of week and time of day  in Charleston, South Carolina. They 
found that a smaller  proportion of African -Americans received ground-patrol citations than 
air-patrol citations. Grogger and Ridgeway (2006) compared the race distribution of drivers 
stopped  during daylight with the counterpart distribution  at night. Using the data from 
Oakland, California, they find no strong evidence on racial profiling. Ridgeway (2006) used 
the propensity score matching method to construct comparable groups and  studied the same 
Oakland  data. It turned out that “black drivers are significantly less likely to be cited than 
non-black drivers, black drivers are slightly less likely to be cited than white drivers, and 
white and non-white drivers are not cited at significantly different rates” (p. 19). 
                                                  
5 This naturally raises a red flag regarding the officers’ intentions given that a study by Lamberth (1996), which 
examined driving habits of African-American and white motorists on Maryland highways, found no difference 
in the rate at which these two segments of motorists engaged in speeding. 
6 For criticism about the residential population benchmark approach, refer to Riley and Ridgeway (2004) and, 
more generally, Engel and Calnon (2004).    7 
Some papers looked at issues other than racial disparities in officers’ behavior. Blalock, 
DeVaro, Leventhal, and Simon (2007) examined traffic ticketing data from Bloomington and 
Highland Park in Illinois, Wichita, Boston, and the entire state of Tennessee and found out 
that women are  more likely to receive citations in three of the five locations and men are 
more likely to receive citations in the other two locations.  Makowsky and Stratmann 
(forthcoming), using the Massachusetts traffic data that Dedman and Latour used, examined 
whether local police officers pursue objectives other than effective policing, such as raising 
local government revenues from out-of-towners. They examined not only officers’ ticketing 
behavior, but also  how they impose speeding fines.  
 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
The original raw data contain 2,001,562 traffic citations issued in Massachusetts between 
April 2001 and November 2002. The data were collected beginning April 1, 2001, as the 
Massachusetts legislature passed “An Act Providing for the Collection of the Data Relative to 
Traffic Stops” in August, 2000. The data include information on the Massachusetts Uniform 
Citation  about motorists, such as race, gender, age, and home town, as well as when  they 
were cited  and where the vehicles were stopped. All information was based upon officers’ 
reporting (Farrell et al., 2004). We merged the citation-level data with the officer personnel 
data obtained from the Boston police department. The administrative personnel data include 
officers’ race, gender, and experience on the force. In the merged data, there are only local 
police officers (i.e. no state police). There are 161,133 matched citations issued by Boston 
police officers within Boston.
7 We focus on speeding tickets and warnings, which account for 
                                                  
7 In the literature, there is a concern about using the data on traffic stops on local streets because officers could 
obtain additional information about drivers from people in the neighborhood and the amount of information   8 
26% of all citations, the largest single category. Warnings were computerized for the first two 
months only, April and May in 2001.  We had to delete observations with missing 
information. First, deleted were  2,041 citations without  vehicle  speed and 3,128 citations 
without  motorists’ race.8 We  also  deleted 1,875 citations where drivers are not white, 
African-American, or Hispanic and 1,031 citations issued by Asian officers. Finally, for some 
reasons explained below,  we focus on a narrow speed range between 10 and 14. Our sample 
includes 14,253 speeding tickets and 1,984 warnings. 
Table 1 (the first column) shows the descriptive statistics:  1) Motorists are  quite young 
(average age is 36).  2) Almost all are Massachusetts residents while only about 50% were 
stopped  and given citations  in their  own  neighborhood.  3) There are a small number of 
commercial-license drivers.  4) About 65% are male drivers.  5) African-American drivers 
account for 32% of tickets, and Hispanics 12%.  According to the 2000 Census, African -
Americans account for 25%, and Hispanics 14% in Boston. If driving habits do not differ by 
drivers’ race (KPT, 2001), this shows that African-American motorists get slightly more 
tickets.  6) About  32% of tickets are issued by African-American officers while 10% by 
Hispanic officers. In the sample, 24% of officers are African-Americans and 10% Hispanic 
officers. Thus it means that African -American officers  issue more tickets per officer.
9 7) 
About 97% of tickets are issued by male officers. 8) A majority of tickets (62%) were issued 
at a 30 mile speed zone. 9) About 46% were issued in the morning between 6AM to noon. 
                                                                                                                                                            
might depend on officers’ race (Anwar and Fang, 2005). This is, however, unlikely to happen when issuing 
speeding tickets.  
8 The motorist’s race is determined by the officer’s reporting. This might explain many citations with missing 
driver race. Also it is possible that the recorded race is different from the actual one. This should not be a 
problem because, for the purpose of this paper, it is officers’ perception about drivers’ race that is more relevant. 
9 According to the 2000 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS), 24% of 
officers are African-American and about 6% are Hispanic nationwide.   9 
10) Lastly, 57% of tickets were issued exactly at 10 miles per hour above the posted speed 
limit.  
 Clustering of Tickets at 10 above 
As noted before, the most distinctive feature of the data is the clustering of tickets at 10.  
Before arguing that officers’ speed discounting accounts for this clustering, we exclude the 
possibility that drivers’ b ehavior could explain this massive heaping of tickets at this very 
specific speed. According to  the Massachusetts statutory formula, for the first ten miles above 
the speed limit, the fine is $75, and then it rises by ten dollars for each additional mile. Given 
that the fine amount is constant up to the speed of 10, it may even be optimal for some 
motorists to maintain that speed. It is, however,  difficult to believe that motorists could 
control their vehicle speed so delicately, particularly considering the city traffic conditions in 
Boston.10    
Furthermore, suppose for a moment that motorists can freely choose vehicle speed. In that 
case, if the optimal speed were determined by a benefit function which  is differentiable and 
continuous in  motorists’ characteristics, those characteristics should not have discretely 
jumped between 10 and  nearby  speeds.11 Also whether to drive at 10 or  11  cannot be an 
accurately intended choice by motorists. It could rather be randomly determined by a 
trembling foot of the motorist or the inherent margin of error of a radar gun of the officer. To 
check this hypothesis, in Table 1, we compare characteristics of motorists cited at 10 and  of 
                                                  
10 Appendix Figure 1 shows the distribution of reported speeds for speeding tickets issued in the City of 
Bloomington between 2004 and 2007. There is no notable spike. The fines are $75 up to 20 m.p.h. above the 
limit and, then, increase to $95 up to 30 (in addition, some driving points will be accumulated according to the 
Illinois point system; 5 points up to 10, 15 points up to 14, and so on). Due to the constant fine in a relatively 
wider range (1-20), there is a weaker incentive for officers to give speed discounting. It seems likely that 
officers are rarely lenient to motorists who exceed the speed limit by more than 20 m.p.h. The Bloomington data 
show that the unusual speed distribution in Boston does not result from drivers’ behavior. 
11 In a working paper, we provided a full-fledged theoretical model analyzing the officers’ underreporting 
decision which can be obtained upon request from the authors.   10 
those cited at a speed level between 11 and 14. Contrary to the hypothesis, we find that some 
motorist  variables are significantly different at very nearby speed levels. Motorists who are 
ticketed at 10 are older, more likely to be out of town, and less likely to be African -American 
or Hispanic.  
If the spike at 10 were totally explained by motorists’ driving behavior and if there were no 
discretionary behavior by officers, then officers’ characteristics should not have discretely 
changed between 10 and nearby speeds.  Again, to the contrary, w e find that  the racial 
composition of officers significantly differs at very nearby speeds. Among officers who 
issued tickets at 10, 18% and 12% are African-American and Hispanic, respectively. On the 
other hand, among those who issued tickets between 11 and 14, 51% and 8% are African -
American and Hispanic. In other words, most of the officers who issued tickets at 10 are 
white, while a majority of those who issued tickets at a speed between 11 and 14 are African -
American.  
The above findings suggest that the spike at 10 is a consequence of officers’ discretionary 
behavior. There exists anecdotal evidence of officers’ discounting the speed. The episode 
quoted at the beginning of this paper supports our argument. To see this better, first consider 
a police officer who  gains some u tility from citing motorists at a speed closer to the actual 
speed  but, at the same time, cares about the fines they will pay. Recall that whether the 
officer issues tickets at 10 or less does not matter at all in terms of the fines motorists will 
pay. Thus, for those drivers who actually drove at a speed higher than 10 but were lucky to 
get speed discounting, 10 would be the most natural  speed reported by such officers.
12 
Second, once officers decide to give a break to some drivers, some prominent speed levels 
may emerge as cognitive reference points. It is a general tendency that people prefer round 
                                                  
12 Alternatively, it is possible that o fficers can set their speed gun to beep at 10 or higher. Then, the motorists 
driving under 10 are not stopped, which can explain as to why the histogram abruptly drops below 10. But this 
cut-off stopping behavior cannot explain why the speed distribution abruptly drops above that speed.   11 
numbers like 10 and 15 ( Johnson  et al., 2007).  And  once such round numbers become 
prominent in ticketing practice and are established as a social norm, officers may further try 
to avoid  looking too meticulous by citing motorists at non-prominent speed levels such as 11 
or 17 when they want to look generous.  
Lastly, one may think of the possibility that the clustering arises due to officers’ behavior 
other than speed discounting, such as over-reporting or random rounding. Note, however, that 
there is no explicit incentive for officers to over-report the speed to 10. While over-reporting 
to 10 does not increase the fine amount and there is no explicit payoff to officers, i t might 
provoke motorists unnecessarily (this may happen even though motorists have no monetary 
reason to get upset). We also believe that random rounding should not be prevalent enough to 
yield such massive clustering of tickets. Suppose that officers round the speed to the nearest 
round number since such  numbers are cognitively less costly to assign. Then, first, officers’ 
and motorists’ characteristics should not differ significantly between 10 and nearby speeds, 
which we have already seen is not true. Second,  if some officers do randomly round the speed 
up or down to the nearest round number, our estimates will be attenuated, making it difficult 
to discern any systematic disparity.  
 
Proxy Variable 
The above discussion suggests that most of motorists who were ticketed exactly at 10 are 
likely to be those who actually drove at a higher speed level but received speed discounting. 
That is, the indicator of whether a motorist gets ticketed at 10 can be a proxy variable for the 
ticketing officer’s leniency toward the motorist. 
Formally, l et  S  denote the  miles reported  above the speed limit  and  let  * S  denote the 
actual speed in miles above the speed  limit. Then, we want to know whether the motorist gets 
speed discounting, that is, whether 
* S S < . For  10 ‡ S , we have:  
   12 
) 10 | Pr( ) 10 Pr( ) 10 | Pr( ) 10 Pr( ) Pr(
* * * > < > + = < = = < S S S S S S S S S S . 
 
The problem is that the true speed is not observable. Thus, we use the proxy variable of 
whether  10 = S  or  10 > S . The proxy variable is “exact” if: 
 
1 ) 10 | Pr(
* = = < S S S  and  0 ) 10 | Pr(
* = > < S S S . 
 
The first assumption is violated when there are motorists who were actually traveling at 10 
and got ticketed at the exact speed (Type I error). The second a ssumption is violated when 
there are motorists who g ot cited at a speed level above 10 (e.g. 11 or 12) while they drove 
faster than the speed (Type II error). If any,  misclassification bias should be minimal. The 
case of Type I error should be not significant given the massive spike at 10, virtually no ticket 
at 9, and a small number of tickets at 11. It is likely that most drivers who drove at 10 just get 
warned.
13  The latter case should be also ignorable since officers would not presumably use 
non-prominent speed levels such as 11 or 12 once they decide to be lenient.  
To promote the  use of the proxy variable further, we restrict our sample to 1) tickets cited 
at a speed level between 10 and 14 or, more strictly, 2) tickets cited at either 10 or 11. Due to 
the massive spike at 10, the first restricted sample still keeps  55% of all speeding  tickets. 
There are two rationales for our sample restriction.  First, since our purpose is to identify 
officers’  speed discounting  as distinctly as possible, we  want to  mi nimize  motorists’ 
heterogeneity. Especially in the second sample, without speed discounting, motorists should 
not differ between the two speed levels which differ by only one mile per hour. Thus, in this 
restricted sample, the inframarginality problem is l ikely to be, although not completely 
avoided, minimized. Second, it is reasonable to assume that officers are less likely to give a 
                                                  
13 In Appendix A, following Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998), we correct for the bias and find that 
our main estimates are strengthened.   13 
break to motorists driving 15 or faster. And even if they give speed discounting to these 
aggressive speeders, the discounted speed should be more likely to be a nearby round number 
such as 15 or 20. 
Note that the sample restriction drops those tickets whose actual speed is between 10 and 
14 but it is reported below 10. This case, however, should be rare given that there are very 
few tickets under 10.   
 
Rank-Order Test of Anwar and Fang (2006) 
Before we specify our estimation equation, we implement the rank-order test of Anwar and 
Fang (2006). It is useful since it can be a first litmus test for relative racial bias. In other 
words, as Anwar and Fang convincingly show, if the test rejects the null hypothesis of no 
racial bias, then we can be sure of its existence. To apply their test to the question here, i.e. 
officers’ lenient behavior regarding speeding tickets, we modify their behavioral model. In 
fact, the model is general enough to consider any kind of officers’ discretionary behavior. 
The decision here is whether an officer is lenient enough to give speed discounting to a 
particular motorist (as opposed to whether to search or not). Following their notations, let 
) , ( p m r r t  denote the cost of a police officer with race  } , { W M rp ˛  treating a motorist of race 
} , { W M rm ˛  harshly.  On the other hand, there is a psychological integrity cost c  by not 
reporting the speed that he or she actually observed. We define that an officer is racially 
prejudiced if  ) ; ( ) ; ( p p r W t r M t „ . Let  G denote the event that the motorist will violate the 
speed limit again in the future when  the motorist is treated leniently.
14 Suppose that the 
                                                  
14 It is uncertain how much officers’ ticketing and speed discounting decisions depend on the likelihood of 
recidivism. It seems reasonable to assume that officers punish recidivists or repeated violators more harshly. But 
we suspect that they would decide the degree of punishment based on their  expectation about recidivism, 
besides the issue of whether, if any, the practice is legitimate. It is unknown whether it is possible for officers to 
predict drivers’ future behavior.   14 
officer observes a single-dimensional index  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ q  that predicts the likelihood of 
recidivism.
15 Before observing q, the officer presumes that a fraction  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛
m r p  of motorists 
of race  m r  will violate the speed limit when they are treated leniently. The index is drawn 
from a distribution 
m r
g f  when the driver is one of those who are believed to speed again and 
from a distribution 
m r
n f  when the driver is one of those who are not believed to speed in the 
future (i.e. the officer believe that the driver made a mistake this time). After observing  q , 
the officer updates his belief about G by Bayes’ rule: 
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
) (
) , | Pr(
q p q p
q p
q















For simplicity, we assume that if the motorist is treated  harshly (i.e. no speed discounting), 
the probability decreases by a factor  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ d . The officer’s decision is whether to treat the 
motorist harshly or leniently. The decision problem conditional on ticketing  is as follows: 
 
} ) ; ( ) , | Pr( ; ) , | Pr( max{




m r r t r G T c r G T - - - - q d q  
 
where  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ T  represents a fixed benefit of ticketing. The officer will treat the motorist 
harshly if  ) , | Pr( ) 1 ( ) ; ( q d m p m r G c r r t - > - . As Anwar and Fang proved, there  exists a  
threshold  ) ; (
*
p m r r q  given c and d .16  
Given the above model, we can apply the rank-order test of Anwar and Fang. We also 
follow the resampling method to ensure that officers of a given race are assigned to different 
districts within Boston with the same probabilities. Since the “success rate” is not observable 
                                                  
15  One may think of this index as a weighted sum of the actual speed and an index for the motorist’s 
characteristics, such as a driving record and attitude. They are unobservable to the econometrician. 
16 If the officer’s benefit from warning is normalized to zero and if the maximum is less than zero, then the 
officer will just warn the motorist. The motorist, who looks favorable to the officer, is likely to get warned.   15 
(whether the motorist will not violate the speed limit again due to the strict treatment), we 
implement the test  only  for the decision regarding speed discounting.
17 First,  using the 
Pearson 
2 c  test, we  strongly reject the hypothesis of  officers’ monolithic behavior for all 
motorist races. As we see in Table 2, the speed discounting rates differ among officer racial 
groups for a given group of motorists. In particular, African-American officers are 
significantly less likely to give speed discounting, while white officers are more likely to be 
lenient to minority motorists than minority officers are. For all three races of motorists, the p -
values are less than 0.001. Second, we also reject the null hypothesis of no racial prejudice. 
For a given race of motorists, the rank order over the discounting rates across officers’ racial 
groups depends on the race of motorists. Specifically, for white motorists, we cannot reject 
the equality between white and Hispanic officers (the z-statistic is 0.2), while white officers 
exhibit higher discounting rates for African -American or Hispanic motorists than African -
American or Hispanic officers do. The test suggests that at least one racial group of officers is 
racially prejudiced. 
  
Estimating Racial Disparities 
Having obtained the results from the rank-order test, we further analyze racial disparities in 
speed discounting. We use the difference-in-difference estimation method (An tonovics and 
Knight, forthcoming), which is more restrictive than the nonparametric rank-order test. We 
estimate a Probit model where the dependent variable is the dummy variable of whether a 
motorist gets ticketed by an officer exactly at 10, conditional that the motorist gets ticketed 
and that the reported speed is between 10 and 14:
18 
                                                  
17 Due to the same reason, we cannot apply the KPT test. 
18 An alternative specification is a zero-inflated Poisson model that allows for  two different data-generating 
processes, one for 10 and another for higher speed levels, 11-14. The results are qualitatively t he same.   16 
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where  T is the dummy variable that equals one if a ticket is issued to the motorist. All 
variables in Table 2  are included in X; motorist characteristics including race ( Motorist), 
officer characteristics including race (Officer), and contextual characteristics, such as time 
and location (Context). Lastly,  of our main interest are interaction terms between officers’ 
and motorists’ races ( Racial Interactions). The variables are expected to capture racial 
disparities in speed discounting.  
Note that if officers always report the actual speed, then the above equation just accounts 
for  motorists’ driving behavior within the speed range from 10 to 14.  If officers’ 
characteristics and the racial interaction terms are uncorrelated with any unobserved motorist 
characteristics that affect the speeding behavior, both  2 b  and  4 b  should be  insignificant. 
Since this is critical to our identification, we will check the assumption in more detail later. 
There are two race dummy variables for motorists (whites are excluded as the base group). 
Interpretation  of these variables is twofold.  On the one hand, they  capture, if any,  racial 
differences in  motorists’ tendency of speeding. If motorists with a specific race tend to  drive 
faster, they are  less likely to get ticketed at 10, which is the lowest speed within the range 
from 10 to 14. On the other hand,  the two  variables may capture officers’  preemptive 
deterrence efforts  or  monolithic  racial  preferences of officers of all races. The first 
emphasizes the ‘schooling drivers’ aspect; officers may be stricter with motorists of a specific 
race if they believe that those motorists will be likely to speed again when  treated leniently. 
Also, o fficers might exhibit  monolithic racial preferences; in this case,  all races of officers 
would  treat the motorists of the mutually most-preferred race more leniently, and t he 
variables for motorists’ race would reveal, if any, the officers’ preference ordering.    17 
Two race dummy variables for  officers  are  expected to capture officers’ race-specific 
strictness relative to white officers (the excluded  base group). Note that the estimates will be 
biased (and underestimated in absolute terms) to the extent at which motorists can predict the 
race of officers they will encounter on their routes. It seems likely in Boston because of the 
“Same Cop /  Same Neighborhood (SC/SN)” policy of the Boston Police Department.
19  But, 
we expect that this kind of bias, if any, will be ignorable. First, we control for neighborhood 
dummy variables. It is not likely that  officers are systematically assigned to districts within 
neighborhoods based on their race and even more unlikely that motorists can predict the race 
of on-duty officers at precincts and streets within neighborhoods. Second, it is also unlikely 
that motorists will alter their speed depending on the expected race of officers. To those 
moderate speeders in our sample, whether there will be an officer on their way regardless of 
the officer’s race should be a more pressing question.  
Once we allow that officers’ leniency differs by their race, the racial interaction terms are 
expected to capture  different-race officers’  disparate treatment of  different-race  motorists. 
Ideally, we want to include six different combinations of officers’ and motorists’ races given 
three racial groups in our study. It is, however, impossible to estimate all six coefficients due 
to perfect collinearity. Thus, we should come up with hypothetical types of racial disparities 
and, accordingly, impose some parametric constraints (Antonovics and Knight, 2004). In this 
pap er, we include the following four dummy variables; 1) racial mismatch with  own-race 
preferences, 2) m inority officer and  minority  motorist, 3) white motorist and African -
American officer,  and 4) African-American motorist and white officer. These variables are 
                                                  
19  Refer to  http://www.cityofboston.gov/police/same_cop.asp. “ Under SC/SN, the same beat officers are 
assigned to a neighborhood beat, and will spend no less than 60% of their shift in that designated beat.” There 
are 11 neighborhoods in Boston. The boundaries of neighborhoods that the police use are slightly different from 
those of neighborhoods in our data.   18 
motivated by the literature or empirically by our data. All four forms of racial disparities may 
coexist.  
Lastly, we address the sample selection problem. Note that the above Probit model ignores 
the fact that officers should first decide whether to issue a warning or a ticket (that is, whether 
1 = T ). Recall that warnings were recorded for the first two months of the data, April and 
May of 2002. Using this subsample, we estimate the Probit selection model:   
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We cannot  a priori exclude certain variables from the primary Probit model for speed 
discounting, so we first rely on identification based on functional form assumptions.  The 
model can be estimated by MLE under the assumption of bivariate normality. After trying 
different specifications for the selection model, we add two squared terms of speed limit and 
age.  In addition, as suggested by Makowsky and Stratmann (forthcoming), we exclude the 
variable for commercial driver’s license from the primary equation.  All the excluded 
variables were insignificant in the primary equation. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Who Gets Speed Discounting from Whom? 
Before proceeding to estimate the Probit model, we look at the racial disparities by using 
the differences-in-differences (diff-in-diff) estimation method. Table 2 shows the results. 
First, we find that white officers are more likely to give speed discounting and  that white 
motorists are more likely to receive speed discounting. The diagonal three estimates in the 
lower right panel are the diff-in-diff estimates. When we separately examine two minority 
groups, African -Americans and Hispanics, we find that African-American officers are 6.6%   19 
less likely to give speed discounting to African-American motorists and Hispanic officers are 
17% less likely to give speed discounting to Hispanic motorists. When they are put together 
into one minority group, minority officers are 12% less likely to give speed discounting to 
minority motorists. The estimates are all significant at the 1% level.  
Table 3 presents the results from the Probit model. We examine tickets between 10 and 14 
in Column (1). In Column (2), the sample is further restricted to tickets cited at 10 and 11 
only. We also do a type of placebo test  in order  to check the validity of our identification 
strategy of exploiting the clustering of tickets at 10. In Column (3), restricting the sample to 
tickets between 11 and 14, we estimate the same Probit model with the different dependent 
variable indicating whether the ticket is cited exactly at 11. This new dependent variable, 
which we call a fictitious proxy variable,  does not proxy speed discounting. The model in 
Column (3) may also reveal  differentials between “the impacts of speed discounting to 10 on 
those tickets at 11” and “the impact s of the same speed discounting to 10 on tickets at 12-14.” 
For example,  regarding female motorists, if officers are more likely to lower the speed from 
11 to 10 than do so from 1 2 to 10, we should find relatively fewer tickets issued to female 
motorists at 11 compared to at 12. In Column (4), we further restrict the sample to 12-14 and 
use the dependent variable of whether the ticket is cited at 12. 
The first notable finding in Column s (1) and (2) is that  motorists’ characteristics are 
insignificant except for the number of violations. This is not surprising since  in the speed 
range of 10-14 or 10-11, motorists are likely to be homogenous as  moderate speeders. The 
finding about the number of violations may also reflect officers’ behavior. Officers would be 
less likely to give a break in terms of speed discounting to those motorists with multiple 
violations.  Each extra violation decreases the probability of being ticketed at 10 by 4.5% 
rather than at a speed level between 11 and 14. 
Unlike motorists’ characteristics,  officers’ characteristics turn out to be mostly significant. 
First, male officers are significantly (33%) more  likely to issue tickets exactly at 10. The   20 
magnitude of this gender gap is substantial. We can even say that speed discounting  is 
basically male officers’ behavior. Second, less experienced officers are more likely to give 
speed discounting. One possible explanation for our findings here is that segments of police 
officers who can get away more easily with speed discounting commit to it more often. The 
males constitute the much larger gender group in the police force, and newer, younger 
officers can easily be forgiven for their mistakes given their relative rookie status.  
We find that relative to white officers, African-American a nd Hispanic officers are 
significantly  less likely to give speed discounting. African -American  and Hispanic  officers 
are about 14% and 9%, respectively, less likely to give speed discounting than white officers. 
It is interesting to find that those officers who are in a minority  status, female,  African -
American, or Hispanic, within the police force are less lenient. These minority segments in 
the police force cannot easily get away with any mistakes and may feel the need to prove 
themselves to the largest (and culturally and administratively dominant) group in the police 
force, namely the while male officers.  
Among the racial interaction terms,  in Column (1) two variables are significant;  one 
between  minority officer and  minority  motorist and the other between white motorist and 
African-American officer. Minority officers are 16% less likely to give speed discounting to 
minority  motorists than white and Hispanic officers are. The gap is larger than that in  the 
diff-in-diff estimate.  African -American officers are also 7% less l ikely to give speed 
discounting to white motorists than white and Hispanic officers are. African -American 
officers are much less lenient to all motorists than other officers; however, they are even less 
lenient to minority motorists than  they are to white motorists.  
The results in Column (2) are remarkably similar to those in Column (1). We find that 
most estimates weaken in magnitude but still remain significant except that the interaction 
term for African-American officer and white motorist becomes insignificant.    21 
In Column (3) and (4) using the fictitious proxy variables, as expected,  we find that most 
variables  are insignificant.  But t he dummy variable for African-American officers is 
significant and opposite in sign (positive) to those in Columns (1) and (2). This means, as 
explained before, that there are relatively more tickets issued by African-American officers at 
11 (or 12) compared to higher speed levels, 12-14 (or 13-14).  It shows that white and 
Hispanic officers tend to discount more tickets that are supposed to be cited at 11 (or 12) than 
those which are supposed to be cited between 12-14 (or 13-14).  
The effect of the speed limit is significantly positive in Column (3) and (4) , while it is 
significantly negative in the first two columns. The negative effect in Columns (1) and (2) is 
likely to be a result of officers’  perception that high speed in itself is a dangerous act and 
should be curbed more with less discounting  as the speed limit the motorists are allowed to 
travel at increases. The positive effect  in Columns (3) and (4) are simply the other side of the 
coin.  It is thus likely to reflect the fact that, taking into account officers’ less lenient ticketing 
in higher speed limit areas,  motorists themselves  may  be reluctan t to speed much in those 
areas, and consequently may get caught and ticketed at the relatively lower speeds in those 
speed ranges, i.e. at 11 in the 11-14 range, and at 12 in the 12-14 range. 
As mentioned earlier,  to account for  officers’ endogenous  choice of whether to issue a 
ticket or a warning, we estimate the sample selection  model in Table  4. Ticketing behavior 
should be correlated with speed discounting behavior. From the selection equation, we find 
that minority officers are more likely to issue tickets rather than warnings to minority 
motorists. This is consistent with our earlier finding that minority officers are  harsher on 
minority motorists. After correcting for selection, we have a stronger result; minority officers 
are about 35% less likely to give speed discounting to minority motorists. 
Robustness across Different Subsamples 
We check our finding’s robustness to officers’ characteristics or motorists’ characteristics. 
Table 5 presents the results for the minority-minority interaction term across different groups   22 
of officers and motorists. We find that the results are quite consistent across different officer 
groups.  Both experienced and inexperienced minority officers are harsher on minority 
motorists. Also the result  holds regardless of whether officers frequently issue speeding 
tickets or not (those who issued 100 tickets or more for 20 months versus others), although 
the result appears stronger among infrequent-ticketing officers.  
The results are also qualitatively consistent across different types of motorists. We find, 
across the board, that minority officers are harsher on minority drivers but the estimates’ 
statistical significance and magnitude are different. First, we find that minority o fficers are 
harsher on  male minority  motorists,  while  we find a slightly weaker and insignificant 
estimate for female motorists. Second, the results are similar between day and night (6PM to 
6AM). At night, the disparity becomes stronger. Third, minority officers are harsher on those 
minority motorists driving relatively old vehicles (aged more than 5 years). The result is not 
significant and very weak for those with newer vehicles. Lastly, we examine whether the 
results change across different neighborhoods. W e define the neighborhoods with 60% or 
more  white population as “ white neighborhoods” and  those with 20% or more African -
American or with 20% or more Hispanic population as “minority neighborhoods.” We find 
that, particularly in the minority neighborhoods, minority officers are harsher on minority 
motorists. The result is weak and insignificant in white neighborhoods. The lack of 
significance might be because of relatively few observations of minority officers and 
minority drivers. 
For further robustness check, first, we control for motorists’ home zip code. Controlling for 
zip codes should further reduce unobserved heterogeneity in motorists’ characteristics given 
the population size of a single  zip code area and the degree of socioeconomic heterogeneity. 
Table 6  shows that our result is strengthened; minority officers are 22% less likely to give 
speed discounting to minority motorists. Second, we exclude tickets issued while there were 
vehicle searches to address the possibility that, as argued in the Related Literature section,   23 
officers could behave differently when  motorists look suspicious.  We find that our main 
result still  holds with this sample. Lastly, w e  examine African-Americans and Hispanics, 
separately and  include four interaction terms (four combinations of African-
American/Hispanic officers/motorists). The result is consistent across all combinations. It is 
found that  minority officers do not differentiate African-American and Hispanic motorists 
(that is,  African -American and Hispanic motorists are treated equally harshly).  The 
magnitude of the racial bias against minority motorists is larger among Hispanic officers than 
African-American  officers.  
 
Unobservable Motorist Characteristics and Nonrandom Deployment of Officers 
We do not observe all the information about motorists that police officers took into account 
when they decided whether to give motorists a break or not. The most important unobserved 
motorist characteristic is their driving record . This omitted variable could bias our estimates. 
The question relevant to our paper is whether minority motorists who get ticketed by minority 
officers are more likely to have a bad driving record .
20 The concern seems to be legitimate in 
that minority officers are assigned to neighborhoods in a way that they are statistically more 
likely to  come across such minority motorists. As mentioned before, Boston police officers 
are likely to be assigned to those districts where more people of their own racial group reside. 
Thus,  m inority officers are more likely to meet minority motorists because they  more 
frequently patrol minority residential areas. If minority motorists in minority  neighborhoods 
are more likely to have a bad driving record, then our estimates will be biased.  
This should not be a real problem in our study, first of all, because  we have already 
included 10 neighborhood dummy variables. If minority motorists in minority neighborhoods 
tend to have a bad driving record, both white and minority officers working in those areas 
                                                  
20 Reversely, you might ask why white motorists who get ticketed by minority officers are less likely to have 
bad driving records. It is a priori uncertain which question is more appropriate to ask.   24 
should be equally likely to meet such bad-driving-record motorists. Furthermore, it seems not 
true at least in our restricted sample that minority drivers are more likely to be ticketed by 
minority officers in minority neighborhoods.  The sample shows the opposite.  In minority 
neighborhoods, 73% of minority motorists are ticketed by white officers. In white 
neighborhoods, about 50% of minority motorists are ticketed by white officers.  
Still our estimates  could be biased if minority officers are assigned to specific streets or 
districts within a neighborhood where minority motorists have a bad  driving record compared 
to white motorists. It is, however, hard to believe that officers are so specifically instructed 
about their patrol areas. As will be elaborated  later in the Discussion section, the finding that 
minority officers  voluntarily  concentrate on  those particular  areas within minority 
neighborhoods does not contradict our conclusion in this paper.  
 
Unrecorded Stops 
One major disadvantage of the Massachusetts traffic data is that it does not record every 
vehicle stop. But officers may  let certain motorists go even without a written warning, which 
the econometrician cannot observe at all. This sort of data censoring might bias our estimates 
for the racial interaction terms, but under very restrictive conditions.  Suppose that minority 
officers  stop vehicles and,  after finding out minority motorists,  only cite those with 
unobservable negative traits (e.g. with a bad driving record or bad attitude). Also  suppose that 
minority officers do not treat  white  motorists differentially by such  unobservable 
characteristics and, additionally, that white officers do not use any such criterion regardless 
of motorists’ race. In this case, the estimate for the interaction term between minority officer 
and minority motorist will be biased and capture unobserved motorist characteristics.  
The above scenario suggests that minority officers are more selective in citing drivers than 
white officers. To check whether it is true, we examine the total number of all citations. The 
idea is that even though we do not observe the number of motorists an officer let go of, we do   25 
observe how many tickets the officer issued per day. Also it is reasonable to assume that the 
more selectively officers choose whom to cite, the fewer citations they will be able to issue 
tickets per day. This suggests the following estimation equation.  
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where  ijkt N  is the total number of tickets (or all citations including written warnings) issued 
by officer race group  i to motorist race group j in neighborhood k on day  t. Since there are 
three racial groups for officers and drivers, respectively, 11 neighborhoods, and 605 days, the 
maximum number of  group-cell  observations is 59,895. Each cell is  defined by the 
quadruplet of ijkt. 
The variable of our main interest here is the interaction term between minority officer and 
minority motorist. To disentangle it from other confounding effects, we include some control 
variables. First, we include the dummy variables for motorists’ races. Since there are fewer 
minority motorists, i t is not surprising to find fewer tickets being  issued to them. Second, we 
include the number of officers in each  group  cell since there should be more citations when 
there are more officers.  Lastly, since the volume of traffic and the number of speeding 
vehicles must vary across time and space, we also add individual  neighborhood and daily 
fixed effects (FE). The neighborhood fixed effects are also important because, as mentioned 
earlier, we expect that minority officers have a higher chance to encounter minority motorists 
in minority neighborhoods.   
Table  7 shows the results. To the contrary of our concern, we find that minority officers 
issue more tickets to minority motorists. In  an average day, minority officers issue about 0.3 
ticket s or 0.5 citations (including written warnings) to minority motorists than to white 
motorists. The same result is found in both white and minority neighborhoods.  This is in   26 
harmony with our  previous finding in speed discounting. Overall, the finding that minority 
officers are harsher on minority motorists is consistent and robust. 
 
V. DISCUSSION: MINORITY OFFICERS IN THE POLICE FORCE AND VIS-À-VIS 
MINORITY MOTORISTS 
Our finding is somewhat unusual  in that, in the rest of the economics and criminology 
literature, racial disparities in law enforcement  predominantly are (explicitly or implicitly) 
associat ed with discriminatory behavior of white officers against minority people.21  To 
comprehend our general finding, one should ask two complementary questions. First, why do 
minority officers prefer to treat minority motorists more strictly? Second,  is it the minority 
motorists who provoke minority officers to be strict? The objective of this Discussion section 
is not to find definite answers, but to search for probable causes. 
As to the first question, we need to investigate minority officers’ preferences and, more 
fundamentally, ask why such preferences are formed. First, we notice that minority officers’ 
strictness against minority motorists is not consistent with own-race preferences. It has been 
found that minority people, particularly African-Americans, have a strong racial identity and 
own-race preferences (Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Fisman  et al., 2008). In -group favoritism is 
also more theoretically grounded in social psychology since people need to feel positively 
about themselves and it is more natural  (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
22 Indeed, the issue in the 
                                                  
21 A few studies did indeed find that minority officers are harsher on minority people in other fields of law 
enforcement. E.g., Brown and Frank (2006) found that black suspects are more likely to be arrested when the 
decision maker is a black officer.  
22 As the recent literature in social psychology and economics finds, racial prejudice is likely to be implicit and 
even unconscious, so it might be revealed only under split-second situations (Price and Wolfers, 2007; Bertrand, 
Chugh, and Mullainathan, 2005). Plant and Peruche (2005) find that, in computer simulations where they have 
to take action within seconds, police officers are more likely to mistakenly shoot African-American suspects 
compared to white ones, although this bias was eliminated after extensive training. But, unlike shooting, 
ticketing is a  conscious prudent behavior. Officers have sufficient time to think about the consequences of their   27 
debate concerning racial profiling is why, if any, cross-race disparities are observed (or felt 
by the public) and whether officers are racially prejudiced. Thus, it seems that this concept by 
itself cannot explain  our finding (although they might be deeply related, as we will show 
below). 
Instead, we focus on minority officers’ status within the police force. Interview-based 
studies often reveal that minority officers frequently feel racial hostility  inside the force and 
have the day -to-day experience of being an outsider – being constantly tested  – within the 
police subculture:  “[black officers] must constantly prove themselves worthy to the many 
whites who view black Americans as unworthy. As they try to make policing fairer for 
residents of black communities, their fellow white officers often view them as ‘radicals’” 
(Bolton Jr. and Feagin, BF hereafter, 2004: 2). This is also likely to be true for Hispanic 
officers.  Minority officers are often perceived to be not as able as white officers by their 
colleagues as well as by people (BF: 105). They are also more likely to experience negative 
social interactions with their supervisors and coworkers (Morris, 1996). Dedman and Latour 
also reported that minority officers desire to be “accepted” and, for that purpose, they do not 
want to “go easy” on minority people. An African-American officer said “we are being 
watched as not only an officer, but also black officers” (BF:  112). We believe that our 
findings are overall consistent with the hypothesis of the disadvantaged status of minority 
officers within the police force.  
Also, equally plausible, minority  officers may want to fix  negative stereotypes about their 
own racial group. This is reasonable because that perception is, no matter whether it is true or 
not, one of the fundamental  causes for their  underprivileged status within the force. 
Alternatively,  they might  just  feel more responsible for or concerned about their own 
communities’ problems.  This is in harmony with the  casual  observation that minority 
                                                                                                                                                            
decisions.  For example, according to 2007 the Illinois Traffic Stops Statistics Study, the median duration is 
about 10 minutes.    28 
community leaders often call for harsh law enforcement because they are more easily blamed 
than whites. In this case, minority officers’ behavior that we found, if that is motivated by 
their emotional attachment to their own racial group, is not inconsistent with own-race 
preference and positive racial identity.  
Lastly, regarding the second question posed in the beginning, it is conceivable that our 
finding is caused by drivers’ behavior in the first place. Looking at drivers’ side is somewhat 
unusual; the racial profiling  literature attempts to  explain any observed racial  disparities  by 
officers’ behavior.23 This approach is reasonable in that it is officers who make decisions and 
take actions: the relationship between officers and the public is hierarchical, so people are not 
in a position to argue against officers, particularly in the situation like vehicle searches. In the 
case of minor offenses such as moderate speeding, it seems plausible that the stopped drivers 
might disagree with officers, complain, and ask for harsh punishment.24 The question is why 
minority motorists are more likely to provoke minority officers despite  such behavior’s 
adverse consequence on themselves.  
The defiance behavior should  not be optimal  unless we restrict drivers’ preferences. 
However, indeed, it seems possible that minority drivers have different preferences about 
minority officers ( or one might say motorists’ racial prejudice).  Simply, it is likely that 
minority motorists argue against minority officers because they feel closer to officers of their 
race, and this more comfortable position may prompt them to dare talking b ack to such 
officers.  Somewhat ironically, t his  cultural  closeness might provoke officers’ unfavorable 
reactions. Of course, we should keep in mind that officers, being professional, should not be 
affected emotionally by drivers’ behavior if it is irrelevant to efficient or fair law enforcement. 
                                                  
23 Anwar and Fang (2006) point out the possibility that motorists’ behavior depends on the race of officers.  
24 Ridgeway (2006) found that black motorists tend to have  longer duration  of vehicle stop although it is 
unknown whether it is due to officers’ intentional tardiness or motorists’ complaining.   29 
Alternatively, it is possible that minority drivers feel disappointed or even betrayed when 
they are harshly treated by officers of their own race.  “[S]ome members of black 
communities perceive them to be traitors” and “[a] large proportion of black police officers 
reported that they commanded more respect from white citizens than from black citizens; 
further, most of these officers also reported that they did not live in the community they 
worked” (BF). Minority officers are therefore dissociated from their own community not only 
because they are police officers, but also because they belong to a different socioeconomic 
class (Leinen, 1984, p. 177).  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although “speed discounting” has always been a very prevalent phenomenon, it has never 
been addressed before in the growing economics and criminology literature regarding 
discretionary behavior of police officers. Studying speed discounting and finding out which 
groups of officers commit to that is therefore a new strand of research.    
Racial  disparities in policing, however, have been studied  extensively  in the stop-and-
search and ticketing literature. Studying racial disparities in the  speed-discounting context, 
however, adds a new and, to a large extent, unexpected dimension to the racial bias literature. 
One might consider racial disparities in speeding tickets as a relatively minor issue compared 
to those in vehicle searches. The issue we examined in this paper is, however, something 
more relevant to p eople everyday. Also, perhaps, it is a unique context to study interactions 
between officers and a fairly large number of motorists. 
A natural question  is whether there should  be any public policy to fix this problem. The 
main problem appears to be that the police departments are dominated by white male officers 
(and their culture) who can use their discretion liberally without any  consequences. It also 
seems that the minority groups in the police force have to do certain things to be accepted by 
this dominant group of white-male police officers.  What is happening in terms of traffic   30 
ticketing is not a mutual  racial discrimination between different races or even against one 
particular race by all races.  Instead, it is the minorities – be it the ones in the police force or 
on the streets as drivers – who seem to suffer at each other’s hands. The ticketing disparity is 
simply the consequence or symptom of the current social structure and culture. One perhaps 
needs to support the current effort of promoting racial diversity in the police force.  
The existing culture and institutional structure, however, may persist for a long time. What 
can be done to treat the symptom – i.e. the minority-to-minority racial disparity in traffic 
ticketing  – in the meantime? The use of speed cameras, which are widespread in the other 
parts of the world and are color-blind in nature, may not only be effective in curbing speeding 
and reducing vehicle accidents,
25 but may also restore the trust of the minorities in the traffic 
ticketing system; this may be a small step  by itself, but it can potentially trigger  additional 
steps in various other racial issues involving minorities.  
To shed better light on this issue, one also needs to collect more  data that on interactions 
between officers and motorists during ticketing stops
26 as well as on those motorists’ driving 
records  – not to mention more  data from other parts of the country where the racial 
composition within the population and the police force favor different types of minorities 
more.  
                                                  
25 Speed cameras also substantially reduce speeding violations and,  as a result, injury crashes.  Retting and 
Farmer (2003) report that, within six months after mobile speed cameras were employed in the District of 
Columbia, the proportion of motorists exceeding speed limits by more than 10 m.p.h. declined by 82 %. Further, 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (1991) reported that, in Garland, Utah, highly publicized speed cameras 
in a 20 m.p.h. school zone reduced the average speed from 36 to 22 m.p.h. In the U.S., speed cameras have been 
used in  35 jurisdictions and red-light cameras have  been used in 300 jurisdictions throughout 22 states  
(http://www.iihs.org/research/topics/auto_enforce_cities.html).  
26 For example, the Miami-Dade Police Department Racial Profiling Study used trained observers to ride with 
police officers. This data collection method would deliver more lively information about police-driver 
interactions while it might be intrusive as well as costly.   31 
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 Appendix A. Misclassification Bias 
As we explained in the paper, our proxy variable classifies those motorists who actually 
traveled exactly at 10 as those who received speed discounting. For the true variable for 
speed discounting,  ) ( 1
* S S < , we use  ) 10 ( 1 = S  as the proxy variable given the speed range 
from 10 to 14. In this Appendix, we follow Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) 
and correct the misclassification bias. If we assume that once officers decide to give speed 
discounting, they do not cite a speed level between 11 and 14 (that is,  we  assume that 
0 ) 14 11 | Pr(
* = £ £ < S S S ), then the misclassification probability is: 
 
) 10 | Pr(
* = = = S S S a . 
 
The expected value of the observed proxy variable is 
 
) ( ) 1 ( ) , 14 10 | ) 10 ( 1 ( b a a X X S S E F - + = £ £ =  
 
We can estimate a and  b  with the maximum likelihood estimation under the normality 
assumption. We found that the misclassification probability is about 0.13  and significant at 
the 1% significance level. The estimates  b  are, however, similar to our previous results. The 
marginal effect of the interaction term between minority officer and minority motorist is 
estimated as -0.174, also significant at the 1% significance level. The other racial interaction 
terms turn out to be insignificant.    36 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Speeding Tickets 
  All  10  11-14  Mean Diff. 



























p = 0.13 








p = 0.91 
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p < 0.01 




     
No. of Observations =   14,253  8,130  6,123   
 
Note: STD stands for standard deviation. Officers’ experience is measured in terms of years 
on the force. The last column shows p-values for mean equality tests between characteristics 
of tickets cited at 10 and those between 11 and 14.   37 
Table 2. Differences in Differences:  ) 1 , 14 10 | 10 Pr( = £ £ = T S S  
 


























































































   




  -0.174b 
[3.93] 
 
WM–MM   0.023  0.151 
 
      -0.128c 
[7.96] 
 
Note: MO stands for minority officers, and MM stands for minority motorists. The number of 
observations is displayed in parentheses. The absolute value of t-statistic  is presented in 
brackets. 
a: (WM–AM) – (WO–AO).  
b: (WM–HM) – (WO–HO).  
c: (WM–MM) – (WO–MO). 
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Table 3. Probit Model for Speed Discounting 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
      Fictitious Proxy Variables 
  Pr(S = 10)  Pr(S = 10)  Pr(S = 11)  Pr (S = 12) 
Sample Speed Range  10-14  10-11  11-14  12-14 
Speed Limit      -0.011***      -0.006***       0.008***       0.006*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Age  0.000  0.000  0.001  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
In Town  -0.007  -0.007  0.017  0.006 
  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
In State  0. 012  0.001  0.011  0.033 
  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.030) 
Commercial Driver License  -0.006  0.003  -0.014  0.053 
  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.035)  (0.048) 
Male Motorist  0.078  0.037  -0.023  -0.003 
  (0.060)  (0.040)  (0.050)  (0.071) 
Male Officer       0.335***       0.191***  0.033  0.026 
  (0.041)  (0.059)  (0.038)  (0.059) 
Male Motorist *   -0.090  -0.022  -0.015  -0.006 
Male Officer  (0.060)  (0.036)  (0.051)  (0.073) 
Years on the Force     -0.024***     -0.009***  -0.001  -0.003* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
African-American Motorist  0.039  0.011  0.025  0.066 
  (0.032)  (0.021)  (0.036)  (0.046) 
Hispanic Motorist  -0.006  -0.017  0.034  0.045 
  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.045)  (0.056) 
African-American Officer      -0.136***     -0.138***       0.127***     0.140** 
  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.047)  (0.059) 
Hispanic Officer    -0.091***  -0.057*  0.026  -0.018 
  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.045)  (0.054) 
Racial Mismatch  0.009  0.018  -0.021  0.044 
  (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.042) 
Minority Motorist *       -0.164***  -0.084*  0.019  -0.003 
Minority Officer  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.056)  (0.070) 
African-American Motorist *   -0.014  -0.022  0.029  -0.084* 
White Officer  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.045)  (0.051) 
White Motorist *    -0.074**  -0.046  0.040  -0.021 
African-American Officer  (0.035)  (0.029)  (0.044)  (0.054) 
# Violations     -0.045***  -0.011*  0.015  0.011 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
Morning    -0.267***    -0.108***  0.023   0.102** 
  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.035)  (0.050)   39 
Afternoon      -0.302***      -0.126***  -0.020        0.151*** 
  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.033)  (0.050) 
Evening      -0.329***      -0.159***  -0.009      0.112** 
  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.034)  (0.051) 
Day of the Week  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Neighborhood  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  14,253  9,439  6,123  4,814 
Pseudo R-squared  0.156  0.193  0.0362  0.027 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means. Included are a 
constant term, six dummy variables for Day of the Week, and 10 dummy variables for 
Neighborhood.     40 
Table 4. Heckman Probit Selection Model 




1(T = 1) 
Speed Discounting 
1(S = 10 | T = 1) 
Speed Limit      -0.153***   -0.008** 
  (0.024)  (0.004) 
Speed Limit Squared       0.003***   
  (0.000)   
Age       0.013***  0.0004 
  (0.004)  (0.0012) 
Age Squared     -0.0002***   
  (0.00004)   
In Town    -0.051**  0.008 
  (0.021)  (0.031) 
In State  -0.057     0.146*** 
  (0.041)  (0.057) 
Commercial Driver License      -0.180***   
  (0.046)   
Male Motorist  0.104  0.157 
  (0.142)  (0.177) 
Male Officer  -0.171       0.380*** 
  (0.121)  (0.144) 
Male Motorist * Male Officer  -0.082  -0.192 
  (0.146)  (0.170) 
Years on the Force        0.008***      -0.014*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
African-American Motorist      -0.215***    0.205** 
  (0.067)  (0.092) 
Hispanic Motorist   -0.166**   0.163* 
  (0.075)  (0.088) 
African-American Officer  0.074  -0.133 
  (0.091)  (0.100) 
Hispanic Officer  0.142  -0.006 
  (0.094)  (0.101) 
Racial Mismatch   0.141*  -0.087 
  (0.077)  (0.083) 
Minority Motorist * Minority Officer     0.269**      -0.351*** 
  (0.113)  (0.135) 
African-American Motorist *   0.106  -0.002 
White Officer  (0.094)  (0.114) 
White Motorist *   -0.053  0.048 
African-American Officer  (0.088)  (0.095) 
Morning     0.153***    -0.299***   41 
  (0.042)  (0.060) 
Afternoon   0.084*    -0.231*** 
  (0.043)  (0.064) 
Evening  0.072    -0.282*** 
  (0.047)  (0.070) 
Rho    -0.438* 
    (0.225) 
Day of the Week  Yes  Yes 
Neighborhood  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations =  3,076  1,285 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. In both columns, marginal effects, except for Rho, are calculated at the 
sample means. The sample is restricted to April and May in 2001 when warnings were 
recorded.  
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Table  5. Results for Minority Officers and Minority Motorists across Subsamples 
  Subsample 1     Subsample 2    
Officers’ Gender  Male       -0.158***  Female   n.a. 
  Officers  (0.046)  Officers   
    [13,896]    [357] 
         
Years on the Force  = 5 Years   -0.326*  5 Years <     -0.106** 
    (0.177)    (0.049) 
    [1,391]    [12,861] 
         
Officers by Total   < 100       -0.234***  100 =    -0.115** 
Number of Tickets    (0.077)    (0.058) 
issued in 20 Months    [4,465]    [9,788] 
         
Motorists’ Gender  Male        -0.196***  Female   -0.111 
  Motorists  (0.055)  Motorists  (0.080) 
    [9,190]    [5,063] 
         
Day and Night  Day     -0.111**  Night      -0.439*** 
  6:00AM  (0.055)  6:00PM  (0.074) 
  -5:59PM  [10,549]  -5:59AM  [3,704] 
         
Vehicle Age  = 5 Years  -0.023  5 Years <   -0.169** 
    (0.085)    (0.076) 
    [4,767]    [4,475] 
         
Neighborhood  White  -0.067  Minority      -0.309*** 
    (0.061)    (0.096) 
    [9,988]     [3,182] 
Note:  All  control variables in our basic model are also included.  We cannot estimate the 
model separately for female officers because of the small sample size.    43 
 
Table 6. Further Robustness Checks 
  (1)  (3)  (3) 
  Controlling for 
Motorist 









       
Minority Motorist *     -0.218***    -0.167***   
Minority Officer  (0.053)  (0.047)   
       
African-American Motorist *         -0.094*** 
African-American Officer      (0.022) 
       
Hispanic Motorist *         -0.099*** 
African-American Officer      (0.031) 
       
African-American Motorist *         -0.160*** 
Hispanic Officer      (0.035) 
       
Hispanic Motorist *         -0.183*** 
Hispanic Officer      (0.049) 
       
Number of Observations  11,281  13,486  14,253 
Pseudo R-squared  0.173  0.172  0.156 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All control variables in our basic model are 
also included.   44 
Table  7. Total Number of Citations per Day 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variables  # Tickets  # Citations  # Ticket   # Ticket 







Number of Officers        1.452***        1.695***        1.543***       1.353*** 
  (0.008)  (0.026)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
African-American Officers    -0.075**  -0.061  -0.073   -0.080** 
  (0.034)  (0.141)  (0.056)  (0.033) 
Hispanic Officers      -0.140***  -0.222*     -0.199***     -0.076*** 
  (0.030)  (0.123)  (0.049)  (0.029) 
African-American Motorists    -0.436***     -0.662***     -0.597***     -0.287*** 
  (0.034)  (0.140)  (0.056)  (0.033) 
Hispanic Motorists    -0.546***     -0.963***     -0.761***      -0.303*** 
  (0.029)  (0.121)  (0.048)  (0.029) 
Racial Mismatch    -0.088***     -0.256***     -0.147***  0.004 
  (0.017)  (0.070)  (0.028)  (0.016) 
Minority Officers *        0.330***       0.458***       0.469***       0.178*** 
Minority Motorists  (0.042)  (0.171)  (0.068)  (0.040) 
White Officers *      0.119***  0.225*    0.107**     0.144*** 
African-American Motorists  (0.029)  (0.121)  (0.048)  (0.029) 
African-American Officers *   0.056*  0.116     0.157***   -0.064** 
White Motorists  (0.029)  (0.121)  (0.048)  (0.029) 
Constant      0.278***      0.519***      0.384***      0.205*** 
  (0.025)  (0.103)  (0.035)  (0.020) 
Neighborhood FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Daily FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  59,895  9,108  32,670  21,780 
R-squared  0.490  0.458  0.501  0.503 
Note: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. There are 605  days, 9 racial matching pairs, and 11 
neighborhoods. The maximum number of observations is 59,895 (= 605*9*11).    45 
Appendix Figure 1. Histogram of Speed on Tickets 
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